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Extraterritorial Enforcement and Prosecutorial 





Corruption is a worldwide problem without a 
comprehensive international solution.1 In 1977, the United 
States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2 (FCPA or Act) 
to enforce anti-bribery laws against U.S. corporations, 
protecting its own reputation and foreign policy interests.3 The 
FCPA prohibits companies that are listed on the U.S. indexes 
and regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) from bribing foreign officials4 and contains provisions 
that require specific accountings to ensure companies cannot 
hide bribes in their financial records.5 The Act specifically 
authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction, which means that as a 
matter of law, it grants the United States far-reaching 
international enforcement power.6   
Unchecked extraterritorial enforcement has become more 
 
       *   J.D. candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008, 
Grinnell College. This Note would not have been possible without the support 
of Professor Richard Painter or the assistance of the editors and staff of the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law. Special thanks go to Steven Willborn 
for his helpful comments on earlier drafts and constant inspiration. 
 1. Although there have been many treaties regarding corruption and 
bribery, they lack the enforcement teeth necessary to address the problems. 
See Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1257, 1292–93 (2007). 
 2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -3, 
78ff (2006)), amended by 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (1988) and 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff(1998). 
 3. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); see Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 757–65 (2011).   
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)-(b) (2006); see McSorley, supra note 4, at 752–57.   
 6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(i), dd-1(a), dd-3(a) (2006); see McSorley, supra 
note 4, at 759.  
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aggressive since 2007.7 Each year, more foreign corporations 
are accused of bribery in foreign nations and named as 
defendants in U.S. suits, a fact which raises questions of comity 
and foreign policy.8 Common prosecutorial tools like non-
prosecution and deferred-prosecution agreements serve as a 
means to bypass judicial scrutiny.9 This lack of judicial or 
legislative direction leads to unclear standards.10 International 
cooperation has become increasingly important, highlighted in 
cases such as Siemens, an action against a German company 
for bribery in Argentina and other foreign countries, and 
Halliburton, an action against a French subsidiary of a U.S. 
company for bribery in Nigeria.11 However, international will to 
enforce foreign bribery laws can lead to questions of conflict 
with foreign law12 and diplomatic issues.13  Therefore, 
extraterritorial application may overreach its bounds in cases 
such as News Corp, where the U.K. has brought its own 
charges and an FCPA action against the U.K. subsidiary of a 
U.S. company for bribery in the U.K.14  This application of the 
 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 8. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 9. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 10. See discussion infra Part I.C.  Many commentators suggest legislative 
amendments to clarify these provisions.  See, e.g., ANDREW WEISSMANN & 
ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING 
BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
(Oct., 2010); Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 609 (2012) [hereinafter 
Compliance Defense]; Charles Weinograd, Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the 
Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine Governmental 
Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 509, 511–12 (2010) (suggesting a two-part 
test to determine a routine governmental action).  
 11. FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions: United States v. Kellogg 
Brown & Root LLC, DEP’T. OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kellogg-brown.html (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2012) (linking to documents related to Halliburton subsidiary 
Kellogg Brown’s investigation and judgment); FCPA and Related Enforcement 
Actions: United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, DEP’T. OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens-
aktiengesellschaft.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (linking to documents 
related to Siemens investigation and judgment); see discussion infra, Part II.B. 
 12. See infra, notes 61–68, and accompanying text.   
 13. See infra notes 130–136, and accompanying text. 
 14. See NEWS CORP., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, 15 (2011), available at 
http://www.newscorp.com/Report2011/2011AR.pdf (“As a result of these 
allegations [of phone hacking and payments to police], the company is subject 
to several ongoing investigations by U.K. and U.S. regulators and 
governmental authorities.”); Joe Pompeo, U.S. Litigation Against Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corp May Not Be Imminent; But It’s Still All Bad News For 
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FCPA leads to difficulties normally associated with 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law such as comity, conflict 
with foreign law, interference with foreign legal proceedings, 
and diplomatic issues. However, recently developed guidelines 
issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC do not 
comprehensively address international factors.15  
This Note examines the FCPA’s extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and suggests a framework for taking international 
factors into account when prosecutors make enforcement 
decisions. Part I describes the history and legislative intent of 
the FCPA, recent trends in enforcement, prosecutorial 
discretion and possible prosecutorial decision-making factors, 
and current FCPA enforcement guidelines. Part II analyzes the 
possible enforcement factors from a perspective of legislative 
intent.  This Note attempts to answer the question of what 
international factors should be included in future prosecutorial 
guidelines issued by the DOJ or SEC. 
 
I. HISTORY, TRENDS, AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA 
A. ORIGIN OF THE FCPA AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed in 
the wake of Watergate, after SEC investigations uncovered 
corrupt payments to foreign officials in countries such as Japan 
and the Netherlands by over 400 American companies, 
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.16  The scandal 
 
Him, CAPITAL N.Y. (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/media/2012/02/5267941/us-litigation-
against-rupert-murdochs-news-corp-may-not-be-imminent-it; Ed Pilkington & 
Dominic Rushe, News Corp Exposed to Growing Legal Threat Following 
Charges for Tabloid Duo, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/nov/20/news-corp-legal-threat-brooks-
coulson-charges. 
 15. The SEC and DOJ issued guidelines on FCPA enforcement on Nov. 14, 
2012.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) 
[hereinafter FCPA GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf; see discussion infra 
Part II.C. 
 16. See S. Rep. No. 95-114 at 3–4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4098, 4101 (referring to SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate 
Practices); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf 
(stating that 400 corporations have admitted to $300 million in corrupt 
payments); see also H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1998) (discussing the 
political climate); Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
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threatened foreign relations as well as the reputations of 
American businesses, as foreign entities attempted to distance 
themselves from the disgrace and Americans reacted with 
distrust.17 Congress intended the passage of the FCPA to 
combat bribery and protect the reputation of American 
businesses and foreign policy positions.18 President Carter’s 
signing statement indicated that the United States had no 
intention of enforcing the Act against corporations 
headquartered abroad, despite the fact that the Act’s language 
permitted this application.19  
In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA.20  The amendment 
clarified the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA21 and directed 
the Executive Branch to encourage foreign trading partners to 
enact legislation similar to the FCPA to level the playing 
field.22 The amendment arose from pressure by corporations 
worried about the FCPA’s costs to American corporations 
 
Act, 73 OHIO L. REV. 929, 932–49 (2012) [hereinafter Story of the FCPA] 
(examining the SEC report and congressional record leading up to the passage 
of the FCPA).  
 17. Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To Be Done 
With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 20  VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 433 
(1987) (“The discovery of payments by Lockheed to the Prime Minister of 
Japan, for example, forced his resignation and chilled relations between the 
two countries.  Reports that Lockheed had paid Prince Bernhardt of the 
Netherlands $1 million compelled him to relinquish his official functions.”). 
 18. Senate Report 114 at 3–4 (indicating that the Senate was primarily 
concerned with the “severe adverse effects” of the uncovered bribery on 
relations with “[f]oreign governments friendly to the United States” and “[t]he 
image of American democracy abroad.”); see Longobardi, supra note 17, at 434 
(citing HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL 
CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. NO. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
5 (1977)). But see Story of the FCPA, supra note 16, at 972–80 (describing 
problems the legislation attempted to address regarding foreign business 
conditions and extortion of American companies, competitive disadvantage of 
American companies doing business abroad, and defining bribery in a 
reasonably predictable way).  
 19. See Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill, 
Statement on Signing S. 305 Into Law, II PUB. PAPERS 1884, 2157 (Dec. 20, 
1977) (indicating that the effort against bribery could only be successful “if 
other countries . . . take comparable action” and urging the United Nations to 
negotiate a treaty on the same subject).  
 20. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff). 
 21. These clarifications are beyond the scope of this Note.  By way of 
example, Congress amended the well-known routine governmental action (or 
“grease”) exception.  See Weinograd, supra note 10, at 517–19.  
 22. See Proposed Legislative History, International Anti-Bribery Act of 
1998, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/leghistory.pdf.  
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competing in foreign markets.23 The amendment had findings 
that there was “unnecessary concern among exporters about 
the scope of the Act,” but that the accounting standards were 
“unclear and excessive.”24 From 1988 to 1998, the United 
States focused its anti-corruption effort on international 
agreements25 instead of aggressive extraterritorial 
enforcement.26  
In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA again, prompted by 
the ratification of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention).27  This time Congress agreed that the FCPA was 
negatively impacting American business success abroad, and 
suggested ratification of this international OECD convention 
on corruption as the solution to international bribery.28  The 
amendment also extended jurisdiction extraterritorially in 
compliance with the OECD convention,29 but Congress did not 
suggest aggressive enforcement abroad.30 President Clinton’s 
 
 23. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
ANTIBRIBERY PROVISIONS: LAY PERSON GUIDE 2, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2013); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICE ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS: COMPTROLLER’S GENERAL REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS 6 (1981).  
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf. 
See also Weinograd, supra note 10, at 517–19 (explaining criticism that the 
FCPA placed US corporations at a disadvantage compared to foreign firms 
who were using bribes to secure contracts). 
 25. See infra notes 53–65, and accompanying text.  
 26. See infra notes 35–37, and accompanying text.  
 27. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff); Org. 
for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, [hereinafter 
OECD Convention], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-
briberyconvention/38028044.pdf. 
 28. See S. REP. No. 105-277, at 2–3 (1998) (explaining how the 
amendment puts the FCPA in line with the OECD Convention in order to 
implement the Convention and “level the playing field”); Proposed Legislative 
History, International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998. 
 29. The OECD Convention called on all parties to assert territorial 
jurisdiction broadly, in order to give the Convention international application.  
OECD Convention, supra note 27, art. 4 (“Each party shall review whether its 
current basis for jurisdiction is effective in the fight against the bribery of 
foreign public officials and, if it is not, shall take remedial steps.”). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(i), dd-1(a), dd-3(a). This is consistent with the 
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signing statement repeated this emphasis on equalizing 
business advantages between the U.S. and foreign companies, 
and focused on enforcement of the convention as the path to 
success.31  
There have been many calls in academic and business 
circles for legislative changes to the FCPA.32  The legislature 
has not passed further amendments on the FCPA since 1998, 
though several amendments have been proposed and a hearing 
about enforcement was held in 2010.33  These critics prompted 
the DOJ and SEC to issue new written guidance in November 
of 2012, in an attempt to clarify prosecutorial treatment of the 




OECD Convention goals of asserting jurisdiction “when the offense is 
committed in whole or in part in [a country’s] territory” or “to prosecute its 
nationals for offences committed abroad.”  OECD Convention, supra note 27, 
art. 4.  
 31. Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair 
Competition Act of 1998, II PUB. PAPERS 1793, 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998). 
 32. See, e.g., WEISSMANN & SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, supra note 10, at 2–8 (proposing a series of amendments to improve 
the FCPA, including adding a compliance defense, adding a “willfulness” 
requirement for corporate criminal liability, clarifying the definition of a 
foreign official, limiting successor and limiting parent company liability). But 
see Brady Dennis & Tom Hamburger, 5 proposed amendments to the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, WASH. POST, April 25, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/5-proposed-amendments-
to-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act/2012/04/25/gIQAXbuVhT_story.html 
(explaining the five proposals by the US Chamber of Commerce and their 
rebuttals by the Open Society Foundation). .  
 33. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Before Subcomm. On Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Hearing], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg66921.pdf; Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R. 3588, 116th Cong. 
(2011); Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531, 116th 




 34. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the 26th 
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 8, 2011) 
[hereinafter Speech], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108.html 
(“[I]n 2012, in what I hope will be a useful and transparent aid, we expect to 
release detailed guidance on the Act’s criminal and civil enforcement 
provisions.”). The SEC and DOJ issued guidelines on FCPA enforcement on 
Nov. 14, 2012.  FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15.  
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B. FCPA ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 
1. Prosecutors’ Increased Extraterritorial Focus 
The DOJ and SEC have expanded their enforcement of the 
FCPA in the last decade.  In the first few years after the FCPA 
was enacted in 1977, prosecutors brought almost no 
enforcement actions.35 Between 1978 and 2004, the SEC tried 
cases under the FCPA an average of less than once per year 
and the DOJ tried an average of less than two cases per year.36  
In 2004, the two agencies brought five cases total.37   
In recent years, the number of FCPA actions and related 
penalties has ballooned. In 2009, the DOJ brought twenty-six 
actions and the SEC brought fourteen civil prosecutions.38 In 
2010, combined corporate fines and penalties under the FCPA 
were approximately $1.8 billion.39 Each agency now has 
between seventy and eighty FCPA investigations open at any 
one time.40 Although the total number of enforcement actions is 
not high compared to likely corruption around the world, the 
number of actions is trending upwards and settlement costs are 
regularly in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.41 The 
largest single action was against Siemens in 2008, resulting in 
$800 million in U.S. fines and $1.6 billion in fines worldwide.42 
 
 35. William L. Larson, Note, Effective Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 32 STAN. L. REV. 561, 568 (1980). 
 36. Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal 
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 
GA. L. REV. 489, 522 n.171 (2010).   
 37. Id. at 522.  
 38. Id. at 522–23.  
 39. Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 100 (2011) [hereinafter Big, Bold, 
and Bizarre].   
 40. See McSorley, supra note 4, at 779.  
 41. See FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html (last visited Nov. 13, 
2010); SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last updated 
Aug. 20, 2012).  
 42. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Siemens AG and Three 
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and 
Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008) 
(“Siemens AG will pay a combined total of more than $1.6 billion . . . including 
$800 million to U.S. authorities, making the combined U.S. penalties the 
largest monetary sanction ever imposed in a FCPA case since the act was 
passed by Congress in 1977.”).  Some believe fines as large as this are not 
enough to stop corporations from bribery.  See 2010 Hearing, supra note 33, at 
2 (“Siemens enjoyed revenue that year of $105 billion and income of 
approximately $8 billion.”).  
WILLBORN Note 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:01 AM 
2013] CALL FOR FCPA PROSECUTORIAL FACTORS 429 
 
The numbers show no sign of slowing actions against 
companies, nor a reduction in fines, and DOJ officials have 
repeated that the priority of FCPA enforcement remains high.43 
The recent appointment of Mary Jo White, a prominent former 
federal prosecutor, to head the SEC may indicate that heavy 
handed prosecution is a priority for that agency as well.44   
The surge in enforcement has increased corporations’ costs 
in two ways.45 First, enforcement imposes higher legal 
settlement costs on corporations under FCPA investigation.46 
Second, enforcement imposes costs on corporations through 
necessary internal investigations.47 Corporations often self-
report the results from these internal investigations to the 
enforcement agencies, which may use them to prosecute or to 
pursue non-prosecution or deferred-prosecution agreements.48 
Extraterritorial enforcement, by its nature, implicates foreign 
policy issues; the very definition of an FCPA violation requires 
that a foreign government official take a bribe, which suggests 
foreign government involvement in the corruption.49 In 
 
 43. See Westbrook, supra note 36, at 523 n.178; Joe Palazzolo, From 
Watergate to Today, How FCPA Became So Feared, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904447525045780247916761511
54.html (quoting Larry Urgenson, lawyer at Kirkland & Ellis, LLP) (“The 
FCPA has gone from a carriage trade into what the [Justice Department] has 
said at times is [its] No. 2 priority behind terrorism.”). 
 44. See Ben Protess and Benjamin Weiser, A Signal to Wall Street in 
Obama’s Pick for Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/mary-jo-white-to-be-named-new-s-e-c-
boss/. 
 45. See supra notes 23–28, and accompanying text; Tor Krever, Curbing 
Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C.J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 83, 90 (2007) (summarizing empirical studies showing that the 
FCPA led to a loss of business or export opportunities). But see id. at 90–91 
(summarizing empirical studies showing that the FCPA had no effect on US 
exports or demand for US products abroad).   
 46. See discussion infra notes 75–80, and accompanying text. 
 47. See Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 106 (giving examples of 
professional costs that companies undertake to respond to FCPA 
investigations).  For example, Pfizer overhauled its FCPA compliance systems 
after reporting instances of bribery to the SEC in 2004.  See Ashby Jones, 




 48. In a non-prosecution agreement, criminal charges are not filed against 
a company.  In a deferred prosecution agreement, criminal charges are filed 
but are not actually prosecuted. See discussion infra Part I:C. 
 49. See Elizabeth Spahn, Discovering Secrets: Act of State Defenses to 
Bribery Cases, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 163, 180 (2010). 
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addition, there is an increasing trend towards enforcing the 
FCPA against foreign-based companies rather than domestic-
based companies.50 Although domestic companies still make up 
the majority of FCPA enforcement actions, the percentage of 
actions against foreign companies is a larger percentage of the 
total than ever before,51 and foreign companies receive higher 
average fines.52   
 
2. Increased Foreign Government and International 
Cooperation to Combat Bribery 
International efforts to combat corruption in a coordinated 
way have increased dramatically in the last two decades.53 The 
focus of the 1998 amendment to the FCPA was the 
international impulse to combat bribery, primarily through the 
OECD Convention.54 The Convention has been ratified by 38 
member states, which have varying but generally increasing 
commitments to the Convention’s enforcement.55 It includes 
mutual assistance programs for bribery convictions, which 
encourage cooperation and assistance between parties to the 
Convention.56 In addition, countries such as Norway and the 
 
 50. See Big, Bold, and Bizzare, supra note 39, at 105 (“[A]pproximately 
90% of 2010 FCPA fines and penalties were paid by foreign companies . . . 
[t]he trend of foreign companies comprising a large percentage of FCPA 
enforcement actions is likely to continue.”). 
 51. See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1775, 1833 (2011) (“[T]he DOJ has targeted more foreign firms than ever 
before . . . .”). 
 52. See id. at 1812 (“[F]or otherwise comparable firms, a foreign firm will 
receive a fine that is on average 22 times larger (between 12 and 41 times 
larger) than the fine of a domestic firm.”). But see id. at 1813 (giving four 
reasons for higher fines for foreign firms apart from different treatment). 
 53. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World 
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 285 (2004) (“States can only govern effectively 
by actively cooperating with other states . . . .”). 
 54. See discussion supra Part I:A.  In addition to the OECD Convention, 
there have been at least six new international treaties addressing corruption, 
showing international momentum to combat the issue. Starr, supra note 1, at 
1292–93 (assessing the impact of seven international treaties). 
 55. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION PROGRESS REPORT 2008 1, 7–8 (2008), available at 
www.transparency.org/content/download/33627/516718; GIBSON DUNN, 2010 
YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 1, 29 (Jan. 4, 2011) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN 
2010], available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpda
te.pdf. 
 56. See OECD Convention, supra note 27, art. 9 (“Each Party shall, to the 
WILLBORN Note 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:01 AM 
2013] CALL FOR FCPA PROSECUTORIAL FACTORS 431 
 
Netherlands have been motivated by the Convention and the 
United States’ urging to change their own laws which, before, 
had allowed bribes to be written off on tax reports as business 
expenses.57 Mutual legal assistance requests between member 
states have supported prosecutions of bribery around the 
globe.58 These legal assistance requests have been used to 
prosecute recent high-profile cases such as the Halliburton 
enforcement action.59 This kind of international cooperation 
was the only international factor emphasized in the new FCPA 
Guidance.60  
Since ratifying the OECD Convention, other countries have 
also enacted robust domestic anti-bribery laws.61 For example, 
the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act became effective in 2011.62 It 
is slightly different from the FCPA, with the most notable 
differences being that the U.K.’s Bribery Act defines both 
bribing and being bribed as offenses,63 contains a strict liability 
 
fullest extent possible . . . provide prompt and effective legal assistance to 
another Party for the purpose of criminal investigations . . . within the scope of 
this Convention.”). 
 57. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. 
Government’s Campaign Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 407, 494–95 (1999) (citing OECD Council Recommendation on 
the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, OECD Doc. 
C(96)27/Final, 35 I.L.M. 1311 (Apr. 11, 1996)) (explaining the success of the 
Convention in addressing the tax deductibility of bribes to foreign officials).  
 58. See GIBSON DUNN 2010, supra note 55, at 29–30; OECD, PHASE 
THREE REPORT ON THE U.S. APPLICATION OF THE OECD CONVENTION, (Oct. 
15, 2010). 
 59. See Steven Pearlstein, Cashing in on Corruption, WASH. POST, Apr. 
25, 2008, at D1 (acknowledging “valuable help from foreign governments since 
the signing of a global convention”); Barbra Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. 
Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s Nigerian Business Practices: 
Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503 
(2006) (analyzing concurrent investigations into Halliburton’s alleged 
misconduct). 
 60. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 7–8, 63 (overviewing international 
anti-corruption efforts including the OECD Convention and the OECD 
Working Group, which monitors the implementation of the OECD 
Convention).  
 61. See Starr, supra note 1, at 1291 (finding that there are criminal 
bribery statutes in virtually every country).  
 62. Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. Bribery Act], 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents. This Act 
came after an enforcement scandal involving BAE, a British military 
corporation and the Saudi government. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1840–
43. 
 63. U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 62, at c. 23 §§ 1–2; see Lawrence W. 
Newman, The New OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, N.Y.L.J. ,  Mar. 
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provision for failure to prevent bribery,64 and provides an 
affirmative compliance defense.65 In addition, the UK’s 
Ministry of Justice proposed using deferred-prosecution 
agreements. However, the agreements would differ from U.S. 
agreements–in the U.K. the judiciary would play a much larger 
role in the agreements, as required by the proposed law.66 
American law could come into conflict with a foreign anti-
bribery law by virtue of a technical difference such as a 
compliance defense, even though the laws have the same policy 
goals.67 Increased international cooperation and increased 
foreign enforcement against the same kind of bribery and 
corruption that the FCPA prohibits leads to questions about 
how U.S. prosecutors should change enforcement in the light of 
 
29, 1999, at 3 (criticizing the OECD and FCPA for extending penalties only to 
suppliers of bribes, and not to foreign officials demanding them). 
 64. U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 62, at c. 23 §§ 7–9. There is no provision 
in the FCPA punishing failure to prevent bribery. 
 65. Id. at § 7; see GIBSON DUNN 2010, supra note 55, at 30–33; 
Compliance Defense, supra note 10, at 636–37. This compliance defense allows 
corporations with robust compliance programs a defense against claims by the 
government. Compliance Defense, supra note 10, at 636–37. Many other 
countries have compliance defenses in their FCPA laws as well.  Id. at 638–44 
(surveying such laws in Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). The DOJ opposes an 
official compliance defense in the United States, but does use compliance as a 
mitigating factor in prosecution and sentencing. See Examining Enforcement 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 33, at 26 (“The Department 
opposes the adoption of a formal compliance defense . . . the Department 
already considers a company’s compliance efforts in making appropriate 
prosecutorial decisions, and the United States Sentencing Guidelines also 
appropriately credits a company’s compliance efforts in any sentencing 
determination.”).  
 66. Kathleen Harris, Will U.K. DPA’s Make a Difference?, FCPA 
PROFESSOR BLOG (Nov. 13, 2012), http://fcpaprofessor.com/will-uk-dpas-make-
a-difference? (addressing a new proposal for the U.K. to use deferred-
prosecution agreements but stating that the use of judicial control make 
prosecutors less powerful than they are in the U.S.). For more on prosecutorial 
power, see discussion infra, notes 74–78, and accompanying text. 
 67. See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the IBC 
Legal’s World Bribery & Corruption Compliance Forum (Oct. 23, 2012) 
[hereinafter IBC Speech], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-121023.html (“In 
short, the world is moving in one direction only with respect to anti-corruption 
efforts . . . I hope and believe that we will continue to make strides in this area 
together.”); Richard L. Cassin, James Murdoch And The FCPA, FCPA BLOG 
(July 11, 2011), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/7/11/james-murdoch-and-
the-fcpa.html (“[I]f the U.K. has sturdy enough laws, why are news outlets in 
London and the U.S. so busy speculating whether James Murdoch could face 
an American criminal prosecution under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?”). 
WILLBORN Note 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:01 AM 
2013] CALL FOR FCPA PROSECUTORIAL FACTORS 433 
 
foreign policy and comity.68   
 
C. EFFECTS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
1. Powerful Prosecutors and Unilateral Decision-Making 
The SEC enforces against civil violations of the FCPA, 
while the DOJ enforces against both civil and criminal 
violations.69 In the early days of FCPA enforcement, the DOJ 
ordered its U.S. Attorneys to continue with investigations only 
with express approval from Washington, and the State 
Department took into account some of the foreign policy 
concerns that were indicated by legislative intent.70  Now, 
although federal prosecutors do technically report to the 
executive branch, and therefore the President, U.S. attorneys 
are seldom subject to direct oversight.71 The push for more 
FCPA enforcement began with Mark Mendelsohn, a young 
prosecutor at the DOJ who realized that the mostly-unenforced 
FCPA could be enforced aggressively by using its far-reaching, 
sweeping provisions.72 However, his broad prosecutorial 
 
 68. See discussion infra Part III:B; Nicolas M. Mclean, Cross-National 
Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L. J. 1970, 1982–86 (2012) 
(analyzing whether prosecutors take into account considerations such as 
foreign policy, international cooperation, foreign direct investment, and 
corruption indexes); Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and 
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-35, 2012) (Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-15, 2012) (analyzing 
enforcement patterns related to foreign policy concerns), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487; George & Lacey, 
supra note 59, at 507–09 (describing concurrent investigations by the DOJ and 
SEC as well as French and Nigerian officials).   
 69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (2006); Longobardi, supra note 17, at 441.  
 70. See Larson, supra note 35, at 569; Kate Gillespie, Middle East 
Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 
1987, at 9–11.  Now, enforcement by the DOJ is reserved for the main DOJ 
Criminal Fraud Section to ensure consistency.  See U.S. Attorney’s Manual § 
9-47.110 (2011) (“No investigation or prosecution of cases involving alleged 
violations . . . shall be instituted without the express authorization of the 
Criminal Division.”). 
 71. Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent 
Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 
380–85 (2001) (discussing the role and responsibilities of US Attorneys and 
the general day-to-day independence they have); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. 
Zacharias, The US Attorneys Scandal and the Allocation of Prosecutorial 
Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008) (discussing allocation of prosecutorial 
power between the President, US attorneys, and individual assistant US 
attorneys). 
 72. See Palazzolo, supra note 43 (“Mark Mendelsohn, a young federal 
prosecutor from the Southern District of New York, was the division’s FCPA 
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discretion has the potential to lead to prosecutorial abuse.73  
Prosecutors work without significant judicial checks and 
balances in part because many cases settle using non-
prosecution and deferred-prosecution agreements.74 Although 
the DOJ uses these agreements in other contexts, they are used 
most often to resolve FCPA investigations.75 These agreements 
are a type of plea bargain that permits prosecutors to charge 
the corporations with the crimes, fine them, and induce them to 
cooperate with the government by taking specific steps to 
improve compliance without a formal enforcement action.76 It 
makes sense to use the agreements when corporations are 
especially cooperative.77 Deferred prosecution agreements may 
result in fines below sentencing guidelines, which encourages 
corporations to elect this alternative when possible.78   
Because of the lower fines imposed when corporations 
cooperate, many of these investigations begin by a corporation’s 
 
point man at the time.”); Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 127 
(criticizing Mendelsohn for starting the FCPA enforcement frenzy as a 
prosecutor, and then moving to a private defense firm). 
 73. See Courtney Thomas, The FCPA: A Decade of Rapid Expansion 29 
REV. LITIG. 439, 462–66 (2010) (submitting arguments on both sides of the 
debate on if the current enforcement system encourages prosecutorial abuse). 
 74. This contrasts with early FCPA prosecutions, when judicial checks 
could be used to incorporate foreign policy concerns. See Margaret A. Niles, 
Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors Under 
the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327, 359 (1983).     
 75. See GIBSON DUNN 2010, supra note 55; Mike Koehler, What Is An 
FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action (examining 
the different actions that may be taken as a result of an FCPA investigation 
and attempting to define what constitutes a single enforcement action). 
 76. See IBC Speech, supra note 67. 
 77. Legislative intent does not support a compliance defense, but the DOJ 
takes corporate compliance efforts and cooperation into account.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-576, at 922–23 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1955 (showing the 1988 amendment originally had a safe harbor 
for corporations with compliance procedures but that it was taken out); Arthur 
F. Matthews, Defending the SEC and DOJ Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Investigations, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 340 (1998) (arguing compliance 
is a mitigating factor in criminal prosecutions) (citing U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(k) (1995) (updated in 2011 at § 8C2.5)), 
available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_8.pdf.   
 78. See Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 128 (finding that in 10 of 
the 12 enforcement actions in 2010, the average fine was 25% below the 
minimum guidelines range). This decreases the value of the guidelines as an 
indicator of liability. 
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voluntary self-reporting.79 Companies then conduct their own 
internal investigations, with the help of outside counsel, and 
provide the material to the DOJ themselves.80 These 
investigations can cost millions of dollars, and often times 
uncover actions that the enforcement agencies would not find 
on their own, but for which companies may still be held liable.81 
The resulting agreements do not have the benefit of a judicial 
check, so even when case law rejects the government’s 
interpretations of a particular provision, prosecutors may 
ignore the courts’ interpretations for the purpose of a 
prosecutorial agreement.82 This creates a prosecutorial 
“common law of settlement” that governs in lieu of judge-made 
or legislative law.83  
 
2. Prosecutorial Enforcement Guidelines Lack Sufficient 
Assistance 
The DOJ and SEC recently issued FCPA enforcement 
guidelines, which were met with criticisms of issuing them too 
late and a lack of clarity. 84 These criticisms are valid and, at 
 
 79. Ironically, this may explain a large portion of enforcement, since 
detection of bribery would otherwise be very difficult.  See Larson, supra note 
35, at 565–70 (stating that “agency enforcement is unlikely ever to be 
effective” because of the difficulty in detecting violations); Garrett, supra note 
51, at 1833 (suggesting the increase in enforcement is partially due to 
voluntary self-reporting). 
 80. See Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 1, 2012, (quoting Assistant Attorney General Breuer as saying “We 
absolutely need companies through their firms to provide us with their 
investigations . . . prosecutors test information they receive from companies 
through parallel investigations.”); Mike Koehler, FCPA-Palooza, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-palooza 
(questioning Breuer’s statements that during his time on the defense bar, he 
“never once got the sense that the enforcement agencies tested the information 
or conducted a parallel investigation”). 
 81. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1786 (reporting that Siemens’ costs of 
investigating its FCPA case were over $500 million in legal fees and that the 
investigation uncovered over $1 billion in bribe payments that had not been 
found by regulators).   
 82. See Big, Bold, and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 119–22 (citing United 
States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004)) (giving an example of a case 
interpreting the FCPA’s “obtain or retain business” element and later 
prosecutions that seem to ignore that interpretation). 
 83. Michael Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG 
(March 16, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.com/prosecutorial-common-law. 
 84. The 1988 amendment included a provision allowing the DOJ to issue 
further guidance on enforcement, but the DOJ declined to do so.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-1(d)-78dd-2(e) (2006); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Anti-Bribery Provisions, 55 
Fed. Reg. 28,694 (July 12, 1990); Mike Koehler, DOJ – Guidance Better Late 
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the very least, the guidelines do not offer new information for 
best practices of the enforcement of the FCPA.85 Others 
criticize the guidance as counter to judicially sanctioned FCPA 
enforcement policy.86 Most legal propositions in the guidelines 
are supported by DOJ or SEC settlements, rather than 
legislative interpretation or case law.87 Along with offering 
little information on domestic questions of prosecution, the 
guidelines fail to offer additional information regarding foreign 
prosecutions or international factors beyond superficial 
references to international cooperation.88 Other statutes that 
are enforced extraterritorially have meaningful guidelines 
regarding extraterritorial enforcement.89  
 
than Never, But Will it Matter?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-guidance-better-late-than-never-but-will-it-
matter (“[T]he Attorney General has determined that no guidelines are 
necessary . . . [Compliance] would not be enhanced nor would the business 
community be assisted by further clarification of these provisions.”); See Mike 
Koehler, Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, 
BLOOMBERG/BNA WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189072; Mike Koehler, 
What If?, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://174.120.83.250/~killer1/cci/what-if (questioning what would happen if 
the enforcement agencies issued guidance after the 1988 or 1998 amendments 
or after a 2010 OECD report recommending guidance).   
 85. Mike Koehler, Guidance Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Nov. 16, 
2012),  http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/guidance-roundup (collecting 
commentary from law firms, individuals, and civil society organizations 
relating to the new guidance, most of whom conclude that “the guidance offers 
little in terms of actual new substance”).  
 86. See Mike Koehler, Do Lanny Breuer and Robert Khuzami Actually 
Read FCPA Enforcement Actions?, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012),  
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/do-lanny-breuer-and-robert-khuzami-actually-
read-fcpa-enforcement-actions (describing the discrepancy between the FPCA 
guidance which proposes prosecution against “payments of real and 
substantial value” and FCPA prosecutions which list minor violations “about a 
bottle of wine . . . a camera, kitchen appliances and business suits” as 
violations substantial enough to sustain an enforcement action); Cf. Story of 
the FCPA, supra note 16, at 1003–13 (describing the FCPA as a “limited 
statute” that captures a narrow range of possible bribery payments, based on 
the recipient and business purpose of the payment).   
 87. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15 at 118–119 n.97–102 (referring to 
DOJ and SEC settlements to support legal claims).  
 88. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 7–8 (addressing the OECD 
Convention and its enforcement, but not expanding upon specific goals or 
procedures of the DOJ or SEC in promoting foreign enforcement).  
 89. The Sherman Act, an anti-trust statute, is enforced against foreign 
firms based on specific judicially created tests that have been incorporated 
into DOJ guidelines.  U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust 
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations §3.1 (1995), http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm. 
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Through these new guidelines, DOJ and SEC show a 
willingness to respond to businesses’ concerns, but the vague 
information included does not assist in predicting enforcement 
patterns.  The guidance lists several examples of potential 
FCPA activity that the DOJ and SEC have declined to pursue, 
but the examples do not address questions American 
corporations are concerned with.90   
FCPA guidance also includes a lay person’s guide,91 
responses to requests for an opinion from the DOJ,92 and a 
listing of previous enforcement actions.93 Investigations might 
not be publicly disclosed, making it harder for companies to 
rely on other corporations’ experiences for reference or 
deterrence purposes.94 Policies regarding corporate criminal 
prosecution lay out factors that will be taken into account,95 but 
the DOJ has not provided any specifics on what companies can 
expect with regard to FCPA enforcement. Criminal sentencing 
guidelines may help companies determine if their conduct will 
be eligible for lesser sanctions, but these guidelines do not 
 
 90. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15.  But see Mike Koehler, The Guidance 
and Declinations, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Nov. 27, 2012),  
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-guidance-and-declinations (noting that these 
are not the first declination decisions announced by the agencies, and that the 
declination decisions do not clarify the factors at play in a decision to 
prosecute).   
 91. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions: Lay Person 
Guide, DEP’T. OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-
persons-guide.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).  
 92. These requests for an opinion are limited to factual situations, not 
hypotheticals, and may be used in future investigations by the DOJ. See FCPA 
OPINIONS, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Oct. 
8, 2012); Garrett, supra note 51, at 1835–36 (describing increased use of 
opinion process as enforcement has increased).   
 93. DOJ FCPA AND RELATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2012.html (last visited Oct. 
27, 2012); SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
 94. See Matthews, supra note 77, at 410–12 (1998) (questioning when 
SEC investigations of privately held companies must be publicized if at all); 
Mike Koehler, Secret FCPA Investigations, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Jan. 3, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/secret-fcpa-enforcement (noting 
inconsistencies in the newly issued FCPA guidance about if individual FCPA 
non-prosecution agreements are made public).   
 95. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Depty Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys, regarding 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 3–4 (Aug. 28, 
2008), http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf  
(setting out nine factors to be used in determining whether to charge a 
corporation in addition to individual prosecution factors).   
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apply to civil sanctions and are not specific to the FCPA.96 
Average DOJ criminal fines in enforcement actions have been 
25-28% below the minimum guidelines, undermining the utility 
of the guidelines as predictors of liability.97  
The combination of aggressive international and foreign 
enforcement, broad prosecutorial discretion, and unhelpful 
prosecutorial guidelines has led to significant confusion about 
the parameters of the FCPA and its enforcement.98 Because 
FCPA cases are enforced extraterritorially, this uncertainty 
regarding compliance also extends to international companies 
in the United States and in foreign countries. Some 
corporations respond with very conservative compliance 
policies.99 Others are advised against self-reporting, even when 
internal compliance issues arise.100 There are no bright lines to 
the law, and therefore no one understands the limits or 
expectations.   
In other corporate legal contexts, regulations and 
guidelines give corporations guidance in order to increase 
consistent compliance.101 Guidance regarding extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has been helpful in antitrust enforcement to clarify 
 
 96. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 77, at §8C2.5. 
 97. See discussion infra, note 78, and accompanying text; Mike Kohler, 
DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA – Year In Review, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Jan. 
9, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-
review-3. 
 98. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 907, 910 (2010) (explaining the “opaque nature of FCPA enforcement”); 
2010 Hearing, supra note 33, at 6–7 (“[O]ne of the basic principles of due 
process is that people in companies have to be able to know what the law is in 
order to comply with it . . . they do not always know what behavior will trigger 
an enforcement action.”). 
 99. For example, Apple’s compliance policies are robust and closely 
tailored to OECD definitions, and Apple was not named in an FCPA 
enforcement action during Steve Jobs’ life.  Compare Apple Business Conduct 
Policy (July 2012), http://investor.apple.com/governance.cfm with OECD 
Convention, supra note 27, art. 1.4(a).   
 100. See Former Federal Prosecutors Pen New Treatise on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, METROPOLITIAN CORP. COUNS. (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/21790/former-federal-prosecutors-
pen-new-treatise-foreign-corrupt-practices-act (quoting attorneys who advise 
some clients to “fix compliance problems . . . without the assistance of the U.S. 
government” through nondisclosure of those compliance problems).   
 101. See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for 
Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 
1233, 1235 (2007) (arguing that effective deterrence results from regulatory 
certainty and shared knowledge of correct compliance, using the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 as an example). 
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the reach of prosecutors and avoid international relations 
issues.102   
 
II. PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT ON INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF 
THE FCPA AND PROSECUTORS’ RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT 
WITHIN THAT INTENT. 
Prosecutors should consider the drafters’ legislative intent 
in the original act, as well as drafters’ intent in the 
amendments touching on international issues with prosecution. 
The drafters’ intent should influence the application of each 
international factor where policy arguments can be made for 
greater prosecution or greater discretion.   
The FCPA has extraterritorial application and deals 
exclusively with behaviors that involve at least one foreign 
country. At its passage in 1977, and its subsequent 
amendments in 1988 and 1998, foreign policy and international 
considerations were important. Commentary focusing on 
increased costs to American businesses is shortsighted in the 
light of increased extraterritorial enforcement. Each 
amendment stemmed from calls for international cooperation 
to solve the global problem of corruption, and each amendment 
was a step closer to a solution at the international level.103   
 
1. DOJ and SEC Guidelines and Their Potential Effects 
on Prosecutors’ Treatment of Legislative Intent 
Prosecutorial guidance is needed to ensure consistent 
application of the law. The use of non-prosecution and deferred 
prosecution agreements circumvents the courts in the vast 
majority of cases.104 The worries about prosecutorial abuse are 
based on prosecutors’ frequent use of these agreements, and the 
 
 102. See Sarah A. Solow, Prosecuting Terrorists as Criminals and the 
Limits of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1483, 1537–49 
(2011) (comparing extraterritoriality due process tests in anti-trust and 
securities statutes to determine a jurisdictional test for terrorists); Harvard 
Law Review Association, Comity and Extraterritoriality in Antitrust 
Enforcement, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1269 (2011) (exploring the way comity has 
recently limited civil antitrust jurisdiction); Salil K. Mehra, Extraterritorial 
Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus, 10 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 191, 211–16 (1999) (giving an overview of the international 
antitrust controversy around the Boeing merger).  
 103. See discussion supra notes 16–33, and accompanying text.   
 104. See discussion supra notes 74–81, and accompanying text.  
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risk that innocent companies “who fear the potential 
aftershocks of the filing of criminal charges” will choose not to 
defend themselves and “risk[ ] the farm” in favor of reaching an 
agreement and being subjected to fines.105 Although some say 
that “the DOJ has done a commendable job of policing itself,”106 
guidance about extraterritorial reach will avoid confusion on 
the part of foreign corporations regarding the reach of 
liability.107  
Guidance through other means will not come quickly and 
may not be effective. In this political climate, legislative action 
is far from certain.108 Even if there is legislative action, the 
culture of enforcement of the FCPA, which includes broad 
prosecutorial discretion with little judicial or executive check, 
will likely remain the same.  
Judicial checks are infrequent, and so far have been 
relatively unsuccessful.109 Current prosecution is inconsistent, 
and extraterritorial enforcement is especially unpredictable.110 
Prosecutorial guidelines that adhere to the legislative intent of 
the current law are needed to clarify prosecutorial priorities, 
ensure consistent application of the law, and assist 
corporations in determining what correct compliance looks like 
on an international scale.111   
 
 105. See Thomas, supra note 73, at 463–64 (giving an overview of the 
arguments that prosecutors are abusing the system in the context of FCPA 
enforcement actions).  
 106. See id. at 465.  
 107. Arguments about the DOJ abuse of discretion also rely on judicial 
checks, which have not yet materialized and are unlikely to become a larger 
player due to the structure and incentives around non and deferred 
prosecution agreements. See id. at 465–66 (relying on individual criminal 
prosecutions for the development of case law, but ignoring the lack of 
development of civil case law).   
 108. Proposed laws have not gotten a lot of traction in the current 
legislative climate.  See Overseas Contractor Reform Act, H.R. 3588, 116th 
Cong. (2011); Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 3531, 
116th Cong. (2011). 
 109. See Big, Bold and Bizarre, supra note 39, at 119–23 (giving the 
example of U.S. v. Kay to indicate a judicial limitation of the “obtain or retain 
business” element, and showing that recent FCPA enforcement actions ignore 
the limitation successfully, garnering settlements even though there are 
questions of if conduct even violated the FCPA are warranted).   
 110. See discussion supra notes 50–52, and accompanying text.  
Extraterritorial enforcement actions have increased in number and fines 
against foreign corporations are higher than fines against American 
corporations.  This makes the uncertainty that stems from FCPA prosecutorial 
discretion and enforcement more important on the international playing field.   
 111. See Doty, supra note 101, at 1235.  
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Although the newly issued guidelines did not take these 
factors into account, any additions to the guidelines should 
carefully consider these issues. There are two main reasons 
why the DOJ and SEC can and should elucidate extraterritorial 
enforcement expectations. First, clarifying extraterritorial 
enforcement discretion will not overreach into the legislative 
arena. Even though the FCPA was drafted with extensive 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, clarifying the reach prosecutors 
should use does not infringe on the legislature’s definitions 
within the act. Second, there are good policy reasons to clarify 
extraterritorial reach. These policy reasons, such as foreign 
policy, comity, promotion of international cooperation, and 
protection of American foreign investments, are reflected in the 
factors proposed below.   
Generally, new guidelines should clarify prosecutorial 
factors while leaving the intent of the legislature alone to 
comply with balance of power concerns. New guidelines should 
not attempt to predict what future congressional intent will be 
by redefining terms or adding defenses to the FCPA, as many 
legislative proposals suggest.112 Instead, guidelines should 
focus on areas of traditional prosecutorial discretion. In the 
case of the FCPA, the guidelines would be most effective if they 
focused mainly on defining when prosecutors should bring an 
extraterritorial case. The guidelines should start by taking the 
relevant international factors into account, with prosecutors 
keeping in mind that their client is “a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.”113 
 
2. FCPA Costs to U.S. Businesses and the Effects of 
Additional Extraterritorial Enforcement 
Although some argue that FCPA enforcement increases 
costs for U.S. businesses, these arguments carry less weight as 
extraterritorial enforcement becomes more active. Legislative 
history from 1977 that focused on increased costs to American 
 
 112. See Michael Volkov, Predictions for DOJ’s Upcoming FCPA Guidance, 
LECLAIRRYAN (Sept. 20, 2012) 
http://www.leclairryan.com/pubs/xprPubDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=78
7 (suggesting the new guidelines may relax successor liability and may further 
define “foreign official”). 
 113. Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).  
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businesses was premised on the assumption that the Act would 
not have aggressive extraterritorial enforcement.114 The 
concern about costs to U.S. businesses was a larger focus 
during the 1998 amendment, but enforcement was still 
concentrated domestically.115 During the 2010 legislative 
hearing, questions of cost were rebutted with increased 
enforcement against foreign companies.116  
As the international enforcement becomes greater, the 
argument that enforcement puts U.S. companies at a cost 
disadvantage loses weight. In addition, concerns about cost are 
rebutted with compelling arguments that companies who 
actually do participate in bribery deserve the high costs of 
enforcement and compliance.117 These arguments apply equally 
to foreign and U.S. companies, since the FCPA was put into 
place to ratify the OECD Convention, which combats an 
international problem.118 If cost is a problem in need of reform, 
legislative proposals can and do suggest appropriate 
amendments.119 Because the increase in extraterritorial 
enforcement spreads the cost of FCPA prosecutions across 
countries, the arguments that there is a cost disadvantage to 
U.S. companies will become less compelling as extraterritorial 
enforcement increases.   
 
B. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS SHOULD INFLUENCE 
DISCRETION 
1. Foreign Policy & Comity 
Early FCPA cases and scholars have advocated for the 
inclusion of foreign policy concerns when making prosecutorial 
decisions.120 In the Act’s early days, FCPA investigations and 
 
 114. See discussion, supra notes 18–19, 26, 28–31, and accompanying text. 
 115. See discussion, supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.  
 116. See 2010 Hearing, supra note 33, at 9–10 (answering the question “[I]s 
this simply putting U.S.-headquartered companies at a disadvantage . . . ?” 
with “. . . I will say that we are clearly prosecuting foreign companies . . . there 
is an increased awareness in places like China and Russia.”).   
 117. See id. at 2 (“Nobody likes to pay fines, but it does not amount to a 
whole lot in the context of what is going on here.”).  
 118. See discussion supra notes 27–31, and accompanying text.  
 119. See Weinograd, supra note 10, at 517–19, 526–29 (giving an overview 
of the vague grease payment exception and asserting that costs on American 
companies demand reform).  
 120. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1983 (“Courts and commentators alike 
have noted that FCPA  investigations and prosecutions can implicate issues of 
foreign policy.”); Id. at 1983 n.42 (citing Clayo Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408–09 (9th Cir. 1983)) (“Any prosecution 
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enforcement actions were restrained by foreign policy 
concerns.121 Empirical evidence now indicates that FCPA 
prosecutors do not take foreign policy goals into account when 
choosing how to proceed.122  Foreign policy and comity goals 
would likely interfere with the consistent application of the 
FCPA by introducing the softer variable of diplomacy. Even so, 
enforcement agencies have taken these goals into account 
successfully in other contexts, and there are important policy 
reasons to consider the foreign policy ramifications of a 
particular FCPA prosecution.   
FCPA investigations focus on the supply side of the 
corruption equation by punishing bribers instead of those who 
have been bribed.123 The FCPA specifically prohibits targeting 
the foreign sovereign in the action.124 In spite of this restriction, 
these investigations still have the potential to be embarrassing 
and destabilizing to the foreign governments taking bribes.125 
 
under the [FCPA] entails risks to our relations with the foreign governments 
involved.”); Gillespie, supra note 70, at 9–11; Niles, supra note 74, at 359 
(noting that prosecution implies a “decision that the interest against allowing 
the United States parties to bribe a foreign government’s officials outweighs 
the interest against possibly offending that government”).  
 121. See discussion supra note 70, and accompanying text; Gillespie, supra 
note 70, at 10–11 (“An informal procedure was established between the Justice 
and State departments to deal with questions of foreign- policy consequences 
of FCPA investigations.”); Mclean, supra note 68, at 1983 n.42 (citing Clayo 
Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408–09 (9th Cir. 
1983) (“The Justice Department and SEC share enforcement responsibilities 
under the FCPA.  They coordinate enforcement of the Act with the State 
Department, recognizing the potential foreign policy problems of these 
actions.”). 
 122. Mclean, supra note 68, at 2003 (“[M]ost proxies for foreign policy 
considerations do not appear to be significantly associated with cross-national 
variation in FCPA enforcement levels once other relevant factors are 
controlled for.”). 
 123. See Newman, supra note 63 (criticizing the OECD and FCPA for 
extending penalties only to suppliers of bribes, and not to foreign officials 
demanding them).  
 124. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A) (2006).  
 125. See Spahn, supra note 49, at 178 (“[T]he interests of the foreign 
sovereign are very much in play, even though the foreign sovereign . . . can 
never personally become a defendant or target of an FCPA criminal 
investigation.”); Mclean, supra note 68, at 1983 n.41 (referring to the Arab 
Spring as an example of “official corruption in galvanizing antigovernment 
protest”). But see Mike Koehler, Shades of Gray, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 4, 
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/shades-of-gray (highlighting a transcript 
in which a judge disagreed with the argument that the reputation of Thailand 
was hurt by alleged corruption, because the corruption may have stemmed 
from conduct by the U.S. citizen-bribers instead of the Thai foreign official-
bribees, therefore sullying the reputation of the United States and not 
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The embarrassment may stem from the nationality of the 
company being investigated, from the nationality of the officials 
allegedly taking corrupt payments, or both.126  This 
embarrassment could create friction between countries.   
Guidelines could be based upon antitrust guidelines, which 
focus on jurisdictional and proximate cause issues.127 This focus 
is valuable because it will also target the most harmful conduct 
to the U.S.128  Because the FCPA’s extraterritorial enforcement 
is clearly intended by Congress, these guidelines should include 
a balance between the intended enforcement process and the 
foreign policy or comity concerns.  Even if comity is used as a 
restraint on civil cases, enforcement may still continue to rise 
through civil crackdown on U.S. and foreign corporations who 
fulfill jurisdictional and comity concerns, as well as through 
criminal enforcement.129  
Comity and due process are used to enforce extraterritorial 
limitations when prosecuting under anti-trust statutes.130 
Extraterritorial enforcement has increased in the same ways 
under these statutes and “[t]he rise in FCPA prosecutions bears 
a family resemblance to trends in the antitrust . . . area.”131 
These statutes have developed extraterritorial guidelines 
through judicial review and legislation.132 Civil antitrust 
enforcement is limited by comity to foreign conduct with links 
 
Thailand).    
 126. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1833–34 (suggesting the difference 
between the two might be small, since bribes may be paid “in a foreign country 
and often by foreign employees of a foreign subsidiary” of a U.S. corporation).    
 127. See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 
supra note 89, at § 3.2.   
 128. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1843 (“[P]rosecutors have strong 
incentives to target foreign conduct that significantly affects the United 
States.”).  
 129. The use of comity has decreased civil cases in the antitrust area, but 
criminal enforcement continues to rise even with guidelines regarding 
defendant’s intended effects on the U.S. market.  See discussion supra note 89, 
and accompanying text; Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 102.    
 130. See Solow, supra note 102, at 1537–49 (2011) (comparing 
extraterritoriality due process tests in anti-trust and securities statutes to 
determine a prosecutorial jurisdiction test for terrorists); Harvard Law Review 
Association, supra note 102 (exploring the way comity has recently limited 
civil antitrust jurisdiction).  
 131. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1837.  The antitrust area also 
experienced an increase in extraterritorial enforcement. Id. at 1819–25 
(describing the increase).  
 132. See id. at 1820. This judicial review is unlikely to be replicated in the 
FCPA case. See discussion supra, notes 74–89, and accompanying text.  
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to significant domestic effects,133 and securities cases are 
limited by 5th amendment due process concerns to defendants 
causing “reasonably foreseeable” harm to U.S. securities 
markets.134 These limits on extraterritoriality are still 
contentious in antitrust, but have thus far avoided repetition of 
international diplomacy issues.135   
The FCPA is more clearly intended to have extraterritorial 
application than the Sherman Act.136 However, issues of 
jurisdiction have already posed problems for the FCPA, and an 
explanation would ensure that enforcement agencies do not 
overstep while clarifying extraterritorial reach for other 
countries.137 Even if prosecutors have good reasons to bring 
more actions on foreign corporations, or to impose higher fines 
on them, the trend of increased extraterritorial enforcement 
may raise questions internationally when comity concerns 
would advise discretion.138 Prosecutors should learn from the 
 
 133. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 
(2004) (holding that comity requires the jurisdiction of ambiguous statutes be 
construed “to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of 
other nations”).  This effectively limited civil suits to proximate cause.  See 
Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 102, at 1273–74.   
 134. Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 102, at 1544–45 (citing 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 
1972)) (“[I]f Congress ha[d] expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct 
outside the United States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by 
foreign relations law, a United States court would be bound to follow the 
Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”). 
 135. Prior to comity restraints, international antitrust enforcement led to a 
diplomatic issue between Europe and the United States when the FTC 
approved a Boeing merger which was contested by Europe.  See Harvard Law 
Review Association, supra note 102, at 1271;  Mehra, supra note 102 (giving a 
thorough overview of the antitrust controversy and pointing out that although 
this dispute involved Europe’s competing corporation Airbus, there are many 
comity related reasons that an international incident could develop). 
 136. Unlike the FCPA, the antitrust statute was not originally intended to 
have extraterritorial application, but its foreign enforcement has evolved over 
the last seven decades.  See Solow, supra note 102.     
 137. See Mike Koehler, Strange Things Happen in Threes – Another 
Challenge in a SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Filed, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 
22, 2012, 7:02 AM) (citing Motion to Dismiss, U.S. S.E.C. v. Sharef, No. 11 Civ. 
9073 (2nd Cir. filed Oct. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/110723792/U-S-v-Herbert-Steffen-Steffen-Motion-
to-Dismiss), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/strange-things-happen-in-threes-
another-challenge-in-a-sec-fcpa-enforcement-action (giving an overview of 
three challenges to SEC FCPA enforcement actions and quoting from one 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to file within the 
statute of limitations). 
 138. Prosecutors may have reasons for a larger number of actions, 
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antitrust example and avoid the perception that U.S. agencies 
are attempting to artificially support U.S. businesses under the 
guise of an international solution. 
In the potential News Corp case, comity would reason 
against prosecution out of respect for the U.K.’s Bribery Act, 
without regard to whether bribery has happened in the United 
States.  According to the terms of the FCPA, there is no 
question as to U.S. jurisdiction. However, if the only discernible 
bribery happened in the U.K., the United States should not 
intervene with FCPA prosecution because the U.K.’s law is 
similar enough to the FCPA in severity to ensure precise 
prosecution of wrongdoers,139 and comity dictates that the 
United States should allow a country to handle its own bribery 
issues. If there is discernible bribery in the United States, the 
argument for use of the FCPA is no stronger. The United States 
would not be able to go after News Corp. for bribery of U.S. 
officials within the U.S., since the FCPA only prohibits bribery 
of foreign officials.140 There may be other reasons to prosecute 
News Corp. in the United States, but the FCPA is not the 
appropriate tool to use in those prosecutions.141   
 
2. International Cooperation Agreements 
Increased international cooperation and reliance on 
treaties could influence prosecutorial discretion so that FCPA 
allegations are pursued less frequently.142 Currently, 
cooperation is taken into account to the extent that it makes 
information-gathering and therefore enforcement easier.143 It is 
 
including (1) a focus on more serious bribery on the part of foreign companies, 
(2) protection of U.S. companies from unfair competition, (3) deterrence of 
undetectable corruption by foreign companies by setting an example using 
detectable corruption, (4) a focus on the most problematic foreign companies, 
and a series of other reasons.  See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1812–13.  
 139. See U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 62. 
 140. Id. 
 141. The U.K. tabloid Daily Mirror has suggested that targets of phone 
tapping might have included 9/11 victims and their family members. See 
Pompeo, supra note 14. Although there is almost no evidence to indicate that 
is the case, it would give the United States an uncontested jurisdictional hook 
to sue. Id. (“[T]he paper’s sourcing was rail-thin . . . it hasn’t gained much 
credence. . . . Credible or not, the D.O.J. and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
have been looking into the claims.”). 
 142. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1986–88; see also Garret, supra note 51, 
at 1834–43.  
 143. See Choi & Davis, supra note 68, at 5 (testing theories of enforcement 
including international coordination, and finding disproportionally greater 
sanctions when a corporation’s home country has a cooperation agreement 
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also the only international factor that was mentioned in the 
newly issued FCPA guidance, indicating that prosecutors are 
taking some international factors into account already.144 
International cooperation could dovetail nicely with comity 
concerns to limit prosecution when the U.S. is considering 
prosecution of the same matters at the same time as other 
countries.145 Under this logic, the U.S. would not have to 
abandon prosecution completely, but might impose lower 
sanctions based on knowledge that another prosecution is 
ongoing.146 On the other hand, the increased use of mutual 
legal assistance treaties has made FCPA prosecutions easier, 
and the DOJ has increasingly relied upon them, increasing 
foreign enforcement actions.147   
These treaties also ensure that the U.S. is not the sole 
enforcer of anti-bribery actions. While some U.S. requests for 
help investigating FCPA violations as agreed by the treaties 
have been denied, the “vast majority” of requests for assistance 
have been granted.148 The treaties have opened doors to 
cooperation between countries to prosecute together.149  
The shared information each country adds to the 
prosecution decreases enforcement costs for all countries, and 
 
with the United States). But see Mclean, supra note 68, at 2003 (“Although the 
presence of a mutual legal assistance treaty with a given country was not a 
significant predictor of FCPA enforcement levels, the presence of regulatory 
and enforcement cooperation with the SEC was a significant determinant of 
FCPA enforcement.”). Choi and Davis criticize Mclean’s analysis, finding that 
“it does not take into account the defendant’s home countries.” Choi & Davis, 
supra note 68, at 14.   
 144. FCPA GUIDANCE, supra note 15, at 7–8, 63.  
 145. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1988 (speculating that “perhaps when 
the United States has a strong enforcement relationship with the host 
country, U.S. authorities are more willing to defer to foreign prosecutors in the 
interests of international comity”). 
 146. See Choi & Davis, supra note 68, at 10.  
 147. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1987 (citing F Joseph Warin, John W.F. 
Chesley & Patrick F. Speice, Jr. Nine Lessons of 2009: The Year-in-Review of 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 19, 45 (2010)) 
(“[I]n 2009, a senior official noted ‘at least twenty-five cooperation requests to 
foreign governments pursuant to mutual legal assistance treaties over the 
past twelve months.’”). 
 148. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1987–88 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES: QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3 OECD 
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY § 10.2 (2010)) ([T]he DOJ “has experienced the 
gamut of cooperation – from full scale sharing of domestic investigative files 
on short notice to outright non-compliance.’”). 
 149. See George & Lacey, supra note 59 (examining concurrent 
investigations by many nations into Halliburton’s alleged misconduct).   
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has made treaties popular enforcement tools. International 
cooperation has the potential to ease prosecution, and allow 
prosecutors to bring more actions with the same resources.  The 
effect of international cooperation on a particular FCPA action 
depends on the context of the action, but often results in 
concurrent prosecutions.  
The Siemens prosecution would not have begun without 
international cooperation. The case began when a bank in 
Lichtenstein noticed unusual transactions and informed 
Siemens as well as bank regulators in Germany and 
Switzerland.150 The U.S. began to investigate only after 
German police arrested Siemens’ officers two years later.151 
Because of the mutual legal assistance provisions in the OECD 
Convention, the SEC and DOJ were able to work closely with 
the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office and induce Siemens to 
plead guilty.152 Under the plea agreement, Seimens paid fines 
of $450 million to the DOJ, $350 million to the SEC, and $800 
million to the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office.153 Siemens 
also avoided a U.S. judgment under the sentencing guidelines 
of $1.35 to $2.7 billion, more than twice the $800 million it paid 
to U.S. agencies.154  
In other cases, international cooperation ensured a case’s 
success. In the Halliburton case, French officials began an 
investigation of illicit payments to Nigerian officials by a joint 
venture that included a Halliburton subsidiary.155 When they 
realized that an American corporation was involved, they 
provided information to the U.S. under their OECD convention 
mutual legal assistance duties.156  The investigation, which 
began in France in 2002,157 concluded in the United States in 
2009 with a DOJ guilty plea and a criminal fine of $402 
million158 and an SEC settlement of an additional $177 
 
 150. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1785.  
 151. See generally id. 
 152. Id. at 1785–86.  
 153. Id. at 1786 (citing Plea Agreement, United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, No. CR-8-367 (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens.pdf).  
 154. Id. at 1786. 
 155. See George & Lacey, supra note 59, at 504–505.  
 156. Id. This was roughly the same time that France adopted the OECD 
Convention. Id. at 507–08.  
 157. Id. at 507.  
 158. Press Release, Department of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC 
Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million 
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million.159 The press releases from both the SEC and DOJ 
acknowledged the role that international cooperation played in 
the resolution of the action.160   
However, the interest in comity may be limited by other 
factors. For example, some countries are not willing to enforce 
anti-bribery laws aggressively. Conflicts in law or policy 
decisions may induce the United States to prosecute a 
particular company if it believes another country is not 
pursuing the case appropriately.161 For example, in 2007, 
allegations emerged that a British company, BAE, bribed Saudi 
officials with hundreds of millions of dollars.162 The British 
investigation was dropped because the investigation “would 
have been devastating for [the British] relationship with an 
important country with whom [the British] cooperate closely on 
terrorism, on security, on the Middle East Peace process.”163 
The U.S. pursued its own action under the FCPA and 
eventually obtained a guilty plea from the U.S. subsidiary of 
BAE.164  Since the BAE action, the U.K.’s new Bribery Act has 
been implemented, bringing British bribery law much closer to 
the FCPA.165  U.S. enforcement agencies may still choose to 
bring an action under the FCPA, but may decide not to do so if 
they are confident that the U.K. will aggressively implement 
the new Bribery Act.  
 
 
Criminal Fine, (Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Halliburton Press Release], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-112.html. 
 159. Press Release, Securities and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges KBR and 
Halliburton for FCPA Violations, (Feb. 11, 2009) [hereinafter SEC Halliburton 
Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm. 
 160. See DOJ Halliburton Press Release, supra note 158 (“Significant 
assistance was provided by . . . authorities in France, Italy, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom.”); SEC Halliburton Press Release, supra note 159 (“This 
case demonstrates the close and cooperative working relationships that have 
developed in FCPA investigations among the SEC, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and foreign law enforcement agencies and securities regulators.”).  
 161. See Garrett, supra note 51, at 1839–43 (laying out limits of 
international cooperation).  
 162. See id. at 1840–42.  
 163. See id. at 1841 (“The Saudis apparently told the British that, should 
the investigation continue, they would no longer cooperate with anti-terrorism 
efforts and a sale of seventy-two Eurofighter jets would be jeopardized.”). 
 164. This guilty plea came in 2010, three years after the allegations 
surfaced.  It was also after British officials rejected a DOJ request for 
assistance in violation of the mutual legal assistance treaty through the 
OECD Convention.  See id. at 1840–41.  
 165. See discussion supra, notes 62–65, and accompanying text.  
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3. Corruption Indexes & Foreign Direct Investment 
Corruption indexes may be an influential factor in a 
prosecutor’s decision to pursue a particular case of bribery.166  
These indexes, such as the one promulgated by Transparency 
International, a non-governmental organization, measure the 
amount of corruption in a particular country using a single 
number indicator.167 The reliance on this simple indicator may 
not be justified or effective given the complex enforcement 
analysis needed in FCPA actions. The corruption index on 
which prosecutors are relying may be from the country in 
which a company is headquartered or may be the corruption 
index of the country in which the bribery allegedly took place. A 
prosecution determination may be based on a measure of 
corruption in those countries. In spite of the existence of these 
indexes, the decision to prosecute should be based first on 
comity and foreign policy interests. When evaluating comity 
interests, a prosecutor may use more discretion when a 
company is headquartered in a country that enforces robust 
anti-bribery laws and a company that is headquartered in a 
country with lax enforcement. The country’s level of 
enforcement is not directly tied to the corruption index of the 
country and comity serves as a more effective tool for 
prosecutorial discretion.   
In addition, these indexes may not accurately measure the 
kind of corruption the FCPA prohibits.  Corruption indexes can 
oversimplify the corruption in a particular country, for instance 
giving a high corruption rating to a particular country where 
corruption consists of many payments for routine governmental 
action, lawful under the FCPA.168  Prosecutors relying on 
 
 166. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1981–82 (explaining “the existence of 
such a relationship is, in a sense, intuitive” as long as FCPA enforcement is 
not highly selective geographically, since higher numbers of foreign officials 
accepting bribes should lead to more instances of corruption, and therefore 
higher levels of enforcement).  
 167. See Transparency International, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.  
 168. Corruption can be distinguished into two categories: top-down 
corruption, through which top officials extract rents from all levels of 
government to line their own pockets in return for major government 
contracts, and bottom-up corruption, through which officials at all levels 
extract small rents from the populous in return for various routine activities.  
These categories of corruption are not mutually exclusive, and some countries 
have a combination of the two instead of leaning more one way or the other. 
FCPA enforcement is meant to distinguish between the two, and punish only 
the first, but most corruption indexes do not make that distinction.  See, e.g., 
WILLBORN Note 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:01 AM 
2013] CALL FOR FCPA PROSECUTORIAL FACTORS 451 
 
corruption indexes will therefore over-prosecute in areas with 
routine “grease” payments.  Moreover, corruption indexes based 
on perceptions may not indicate changes in actual corruption, 
and may miss corruption that is not perceived.169 Some 
corruption indexes suffer from both of these issues: they 
conflate illegal with legal bribery, and rely on perceptions 
instead of individual experience.170  
The U.S. has an interest in protecting investments abroad 
from bribery and corruption. For that reason, prosecutors may 
use the amount of U.S. money flowing into a country to 
determine whether to prosecute.171 This reasoning could also be 
used to prosecute corporations headquartered in one country 
and bribing in another, potentially expanding extraterritorial 
enforcement with regard to two foreign countries at the same 
time.172 Protecting American money and investment abroad is 
not in line with the original intent of the FCPA, which was 
enacted to protect the reputation of American companies. The 
new protections may be at odds with comity or foreign policy if 
foreign countries see FCPA enforcement actions as an 
intrusion.  However, protecting foreign direct investment is in 
line with the new legislative intent of 1998 to combat 
corruption while ensuring that American businesses function 
without competitive disadvantage.173 Importantly, prosecution 
taking corruption indexes and each of the other international 
 
id. at 4 (capturing corruption as a “single aggregate indicator” and defining 
corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”). 
 169. See Mclean, supra note 68, at 1982 n.38 (“[P]erceptions, after all, 
might well have a tendency to persist over time.”).   
 170. Some corruption surveys do attempt to use individual experience to 
gather data, but run into issues with defining the terms like “government 
official” and ignore cultural perceptions of what a bribe is in the first place.  
See id. at 1991–92 (using the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) 
question “During the past year has any government official, for instance a 
customs officer, police officer, or inspector in your own country, asked you or 
expected you to pay a bribe for his services?”).  
 171. Id. at 1979–81 (giving reasons why investment may induce greater or 
lesser prosecution).   
 172. This line of reasoning may support prosecuting more US companies.  
See Krever, supra note 45, at 92–93 (citing J.S. Hellman, et al., Are Foreign 
Investors and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition 
Economies?  TRANSITION 4, 6 (World Bank, 2000) (“A higher percentage of US 
firms pay public procurement kickbacks (over 40%) in the countries analyzed 
than do firms based in France, Germany, and the U.K.”). 
 173. But see A Tale of Two Laws, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21529103 (arguing that current enforcement 
of the FCPA in poor corruption-ridden countries deters American companies 
from entering those markets in the first place).     
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factors into account should be in line with legislative intent. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The nature of extraterritorial enforcement and its 
increased use in the FCPA context naturally raises difficulties 
regarding foreign policy, comity, and diplomacy that 
prosecutors do not seem to take into consideration. Although 
there are legislative proposals to clarify provisions of the FCPA, 
prosecutorial guidance from the DOJ and SEC that takes 
international factors into account is necessary, especially 
prosecutors often work outside of executive or judicial checks.  
Legislative intent regarding enforcement is already clear, but 
the enforcement agencies must issue guidance concerning the 
extraterritorial enforcement and international factors in order 
to clarify prosecution.  
Foreign policy and comity should restrict extraterritorial 
prosecution to the extent that a foreign country is prosecuting 
its own corruption, and to the extent that the bribery had little 
direct or indirect effect on the United States. International 
cooperation may enhance prosecutions to the extent that it 
makes prosecution easier, but there may be limits to 
international cooperation’s efficacy in prosecution, because of 
possible conflicts between U.S. and foreign law and the limits of 
comity. Corruption indexes and foreign direct investment may 
indicate a geographic focus for prosecution, but corruption 
indexes are unreliable measures of illegal bribery, and the use 
of foreign direct investment is not supported by legislative 
history. Prosecutors should limit their discretion by foreign 
policy and comity concerns, while taking international 
cooperation into account more as international motivation to 
combat bribery increases.  
 
